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Aggregate Demand and Long-Run
Unemployment
WHAT DETERMINES the unemployment rate? In answering this question,
mainstream economics draws a sharp distinction between the short run and
the long run. According to the conventional view, short-run movements in
unemployment are strongly inﬂuenced by monetary policy and other deter-
minants of aggregate demand. In the long run, however, unemployment
returns to a natural rate or NAIRU (the nonaccelerating-inflation rate of
unemployment), which is determined by labor market frictions. The
NAIRU can change over time for microeconomic reasons, such as changes
in labor market institutions. But the conventional wisdom holds that the
NAIRU is unaffected by aggregate demand, and thus that demand does not
inﬂuence long-run unemployment trends.
This paper argues that this conventional view is wrong. Monetary policy
and other determinants of aggregate demand have strong effects on long-
run as well as short-run movements in unemployment. And this is not just
a theoretical point. Over the last twenty years the behavior of demand
accounts for much of the differences across countries in the evolution of
unemployment.
Aggregate demand has long-run effects on unemployment because of
what Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers have called hysteresis.
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ment away from the current NAIRU, this causes the NAIRU itself to
change over time. A number of authors (including myself)
2 have presented
empirical evidence in favor of hysteresis, but many students of un-
employment remain unpersuaded. The broad goal of this paper is to bolster
the case for hysteresis in industrial countries in the 1980s and 1990s.
This paper also documents two specific aspects of hysteresis that are
important in recent history. The ﬁrst concerns the role of monetary policy
in determining whether hysteresis arises—whether a cyclical rise in unem-
ployment causes a rise in the NAIRU. Here I primarily examine the early
1980s, when most member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) experienced recessions arising
from disinflationary monetary policy. In some countries, such as the
United States, the rise in unemployment was transitory; in others, includ-
ing many European countries, the NAIRU rose and unemployment has
remained high ever since. I argue that the reactions of policymakers to
the early-1980s recessions largely explain these differences. In countries
where unemployment rose only temporarily, it did so because of strongly
countercyclical policy: after tight policy produced a recession to disin-
flate the economy, policy shifted toward expansion, reducing unemploy-
ment. In countries where unemployment rose permanently, it did so
because policy remained tight in the face of the 1980s recessions.
This analysis implies that passive macroeconomic policy during a reces-
sion has a high cost: it can lead to permanently higher unemployment. And
there do not appear to be substantial benefits from such inaction. I find
that countries that combated recessions with expansionary policy still
obtained lower inflation from the initial rise in unemployment. Countries
that kept policy tight did not gain an additional reduction in inﬂation.
Most previous discussions of hysteresis focus on its role in explaining
increases in unemployment. The second part of my analysis asks whether
hysteresis works in reverse—whether demand expansions can produce
permanent decreases in unemployment. Here I examine the period from
1985 through 1997, when several countries emerged as success stories in
reducing unemployment. In particular, I identify four countries where
unemployment has fallen substantially since 1985—Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—and contrast them with coun-
190 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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helps explain the success stories: their decreases in unemployment were
caused largely by demand expansions. These expansions reflected both
intentional monetary policy and unintentional overheatings of the econ-
omy caused by nonmonetary shocks. As with countercyclical responses
to recessions, the costs of the demand expansions were modest. There
were temporary runups in inflation, but in the end the success stories
achieved both low inﬂation and relatively low unemployment.
Most previous authors who have discussed unemployment trends
emphasize distortions in labor markets. They argue that unemployment is
determined by institutions such as labor unions, unemployment insur-
ance, and firing restrictions. I argue that the conventional wisdom over-
rates these factors. In explaining rises in unemployment in the early 1980s,
I find that unemployment insurance plays a role: both a long duration of
beneﬁts and passive macroeconomic policy contribute to hysteresis.
3 How-
ever, labor market policies are not important causes of the unemployment
successes and failures since 1985.
Most of this paper is empirical. At the end, however, I sketch a new
theory of hysteresis. The central feature of the model is a Phillips curve
in which only short-term unemployment affects inﬂation. The model cap-
tures the broad facts uncovered in the empirical work.
The rest of this paper contains four sections. The first examines why
hysteresis arose in some countries but not others in the early 1980s, and it
briefly considers the early 1990s as well. The second section examines
the roles of labor market policies and aggregate demand in explaining why
unemployment fell in some countries and remained high in others from
1985 through 1997. The third section presents my theoretical model. The
fourth section compares my results with those of previous work and dis-
cusses policy implications.
The Role of Policy Responses to Recessions
This section argues that a cyclical rise in unemployment sometimes
leads to a higher NAIRU and sometimes does not. Most important,
Laurence Ball 191
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hysteresis.
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policy to the recession. To make this point, I focus mainly on the early
1980s, a period when most OECD countries experienced recessions as a
result of anti-inflationary monetary policy. Although the recessions were
initially similar, central banks in different countries responded to them
differently. In some countries, central banks responded with sharp mone-
tary easing. These policies produced spurts of rapid growth that brought
output back to trend and reduced unemployment to roughly its level before
the recession. In other countries, policy remained tight despite the reces-
sion because policymakers wanted to reduce inflation further or to support
currencies. In these countries the recessions eventually ended, but with-
out the spurt of rapid growth needed to bring output back to its previous
trend. Unemployment stayed high and inflation eventually stabilized,
implying a higher NAIRU.
The ﬁrst part of this section analyzes the experience of the six countries
out of the Group of Seven (G-7) large industrial countries that experienced
recessions in the early 1980s (Japan did not). I emphasize these countries
because they have reliable quarterly output data, which allow a precise
dating of recessions and policy responses. Following Christina Romer and
David Romer,
4 I assess the behavior of policy by examining short-term
interest rates during the recessions and by reading the historical record. The
second part of the section extends the analysis to a total of seventeen OECD
countries that experienced recessions in the early 1980s. Here the mea-
surement of policy is cruder, but the larger sample is important for
separating the roles of monetary policy and unemployment benefits in
creating hysteresis. I also briefly consider the recessions of the 1990s,
which turn out to yield less information on the determinants of hysteresis.
Evidence for the G-7 Countries
Here I identify recessions in the G-7 countries in the early 1980s and
examine the responses of monetary policy. I then investigate the implica-
tions of different countries’responses for the behavior of output, unem-
ployment, and inﬂation.
IDENTIFYING RECESSIONS. If one were studying the United States
alone, it would be natural to identify recessions based on the standard
dating by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Since I
192 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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sions that reproduces the NBER dates for the United States but can also
be applied to other countries. I assume that a recession occurs any time
real GDP falls two quarters in a row, or falls by more than 2 percent in
any one quarter. (The latter criterion is needed to capture the U.S. reces-
sion of the second quarter of 1980.) The peak preceding a recession is
deﬁned as the quarter with the highest level of real GDP preceding the two
quarterly declines or the one large decline; the trough of the recession is
the quarter with the lowest level of GDP after the peak. For the post–World
War II United States, this definition yields exactly the same eight reces-
sions, with the same quarterly peaks and troughs, that the NBER identi-
ﬁes with its judgmental method.
I examine recessions with preceding peaks in any year from 1979
through 1984. Japan has no recessions in this period, Germany has one,
and the other ﬁve G-7 countries have two each. Tables 1 and 2 list the dates
of the recessions. In all six countries that experienced recessions, a major
cause was tight monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation. Examples
include the disinflation in the United States undertaken by the Federal
Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker, and the disinflation in the United
Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In all these countries,
the central bank raised interest rates sharply in the late 1970s or early
1980s, and inﬂation fell subsequently.
MEASURING POLICY RESPONSES WITH INTEREST RATES. I now examine
the responses of monetary policy to the recessions. The six countries
divide into two groups. The two North American countries (NA2; table 1)
responded to their recessions by easing policy sharply, whereas the four
European countries (E4; table 2) kept policy tight.
I first measure policy responses to recessions by examining short-term
interest rates. Following Romer and Romer,
5 I measure this response by
the change in interest rates between the peak and the quarter after the
trough. Romer and Romer ﬁnd that the Fed reduced nominal and real inter-
est rates substantially during this period in all eight of the U.S. recessions
since World War II. For the early 1980s I confirm this finding for the
United States, but it does not carry over to all other countries.
For a given quarter, the nominal interest rate is deﬁned as the average of
a country’s treasury bill rate, which is taken from International Financial
Laurence Ball 193
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08032—BI/BPEA Ball  12/30/99 9:19 AM  Page 195Statistics.6 Following the bulk of applied work on measuring the stance
of policy, I compute the real interest rate by subtracting the previous year’s
rate of consumer price inﬂation from the current interest rate. (John Taylor
and many OECD and IMF researchers, among others, have followed this
approach.7) For quarter t, it is common in previous work to use the average
of inflation from t – 3 through t. This timing is questionable, however,
since inﬂation for quarter t is not known when interest rates are set during
that quarter, although agents have some information about it. I therefore
also experiment with using inﬂation from t – 4 through t – 1. The choice of
timing makes some difference for the behavior of real interest rates in
individual countries but does not affect the broad conclusions. In the
results reported here, I compromise by using the average of the two
inﬂation rates.8
Tables 1 and 2 present data on changes in nominal and real interest rates
during the recessions of the early 1980s. Following Romer and Romer, I
show the changes for each quarter and summarize the results for each reces-
sion with the total change from the peak to one quarter after the trough.
This exercise yields a sharp dichotomy between the North American
countries and the European countries. In the four recessions in the NA2,
the total change in the real interest rate from the peak to the quarter after
the trough ranges from –1.4 to –5.4 percentage points, with an average of
–3.4 percentage points. In the seven recessions in the E4, there is always
less easing of policy, and often even a tightening: the change in the real
interest rate ranges from –1.1 to +2.6 percentage points, with an average of
+0.2 percentage point. Tables 1 and 2 also show that the differences in
real interest rate behavior result mainly from differences in nominal inter-
est rates rather than differences in inﬂation. In most cases the United States
and Canada cut nominal rates sharply during recessions, whereas the
European countries held them steady or raised them slightly.
196 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
6. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
7. Taylor (1993).
8. The case in which the choice of timing makes the most difference is the second U.S.
recession. In this case, the decline in the real interest rate from the peak to the quarter after
the trough is 1.3 percentage points if one uses inflation from quarter t – 3 through t, and
3.4 percentage points if one uses inﬂation from t – 4 through t – 1. The average of 2.4 percentage
points is close to the fall in the real interest rate implied by inflation forecasts in the Fed’s
Greenbook.
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In the United States and Canada, the policy responses to recessions
were quick. There were large cuts in nominal and real interest rates in the
ﬁrst quarter of each U.S. recession and within the ﬁrst two quarters of each
Canadian recession. These facts are perhaps surprising in light of the
conventional view that policymakers in the early 1980s were focused on
fighting inflation. For example, high inflation caused the Volcker Fed to
tighten policy before the two U.S. recessions. But the Fed eased as soon as
the recessions began, even though inﬂation had not yet fallen substantially.
HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF POLICY. Since interest rates are imperfect
measures of policy stance, I have also examined the historical record. In
particular, it is revealing to compare policy discussions in the United States
and the United Kingdom. For the United States, Romer and Romer as
well as John Boschen and Leonard Mills use the minutes of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) to argue that the Fed reacted strongly to
the early-1980s recessions.
9 For example, in April 1980, at the start of the
first recession, the FOMC reduced interest rates because it did not want
to “exacerbate recessionary tendencies in the economy.” In June 1982, dur-
ing the second recession, it expressed an intention “to provide sufficient
monetary growth to encourage recovery in economic activity.”
Examination of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin for the early
1980s does not reveal anti-recessionary rhetoric like that of the Fed.
Instead the discussions emphasize the importance of staying the course in
ﬁghting inﬂation, even at the cost of recession. In the June 1980 issue, pol-
icymakers seem resigned to a recession: “Rising inﬂation against a policy
of monetary restraint is bound to worsen prospects for the real economy in
the short term. Signs of a slowdown in demand and output accumulated
through 1979, and substantial falls in output and employment are likely
as the recession develops.”
10
Despite this assessment, the bulletin states that:
Government fiscal and monetary policies are designed to bring about a
progressive reduction in inflation, and need to be continued till that end is
accomplished: a less restrictive policy would clearly be inappropriate at a time
when inflation is so high. Weaker demand should help to moderate inflation; but
recession is coming later than expected, and the full effects on wages and prices
9. Romer and Romer (1994); Boschen and Mills (1991).
10. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June 1980, p. 119.
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gradual and pervasive, with effects to be looked for over a period of years.11
In later issues the bulletin discusses the deepening recession but still
takes it for granted that policy must be kept tight to reduce inflation. In
December 1980 it argues that “policy has been effective in slowing down
inflation. It will be important for the future to maintain the thrust of
monetary restraint.”12
I have also examined policy in the early 1980s in the other European
countries, mainly using the OECD’s economic surveys of its member
countries. The continental European countries also failed to ease policy
in the face of recessions. Often the reason was a desire to support curren-
cies within the European Monetary System (EMS). For example, the
1982–83 survey for France reports that:
although one of the authorities’main objectives was to bring domestic interest
rates down so as to ensure conditions conducive to an upturn in economic activ-
ity, their room for manoeuvre was strictly limited by the pressures of the for-
eign exchange market in an international context of high interest rates.13
Pressure on the franc led to sharp interest rate rises in the middle of 1981
and again in early 1982 and kept interest rates high thereafter.14
OUTPUT DURING RECOVERIES. To understand unemployment, it is use-
ful ﬁrst to examine the behavior of output. In doing so, I again take Romer
and Romer’s analysis of the United States as a starting point. Romer and
Romer discuss the stylized fact, identified by Daniel Sichel, among oth-
ers,15 that U.S. recessions are usually followed by a “recovery” period in
which growth is well above normal. This extra growth returns output to
its previous trend after the recession pushes it below trend. Romer and
198 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
11. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June 1980, p. 138.
12. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, December 1980, p. 406.
13. OECD (1983, pp. 44–45).
14. In his comment on this paper, N. Gregory Mankiw accepts my evidence that countries
with tight monetary policy suffered relatively large increases in the NAIRU. He argues,
however, that causality may run from exogenous NAIRU movements to the behavior of pol-
icy. His story is plausible a priori, but the historical record refutes his interpretation of
policy. For example, the reason that France failed to ease policy as the United States did
was not concern over a rising NAIRU, but rather the constraint from its exchange rate regime.
And the behavior of the United Kingdom is explained simply by extreme policy objectives.
The Bank of England kept policy tight because it viewed economic recovery as much less
important than disinﬂation.
15. Sichel (1994).
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ary response of monetary policy to recessions. From their estimates of the
impact of monetary policy, they argue that growth following recessions
would not be substantially above its average level if policy did not ease.
As we have seen, the E4 countries did not ease policy when recessions
occurred in the early 1980s. Thus Romer and Romer’s explanation for U.S.
recoveries suggests that output should not have grown rapidly after the
E4 recessions. And this is the case, as demonstrated by tables 3 and 4,
which show growth in the NA2 and the E4, respectively, after the troughs
of recessions in the early 1980s. The tables show average annualized
growth (measured as the change in the logarithm of output) for the first
four quarters and the first eight quarters after the trough. In the United
States and Canada, growth picks up strongly after each recession. After the
ﬁrst recession in these countries, growth is interrupted by the second reces-
sion. But after the second recession there is a sustained growth spurt: aver-
age annualized growth in the eight quarters after the second trough is
5.2 percent in the United States and 6.2 percent in Canada. In the European
recoveries, by contrast, growth is not much above estimates of its long-run
trend: with one exception (the second U.K. recession), average growth in
the eight quarters after a trough is less than 3 percent.
The absence of strong recoveries in the E4 suggests that output in these
countries does not return quickly to its previous trend after a recession: the
level of output stays low for a long time, if not forever. Tables 3 and 4
confirm this by showing average growth from the first cyclical peak to
twenty quarters and forty quarters after the peak. In the United States and
Laurence Ball 199
Table 3. Output Growth During Recoveries from Recession in the United States
and Canada, 1980–83
Percent change (annual rate)
United States, United States, Canada, Canada,
Period 1980 1981–82 1980 1981–83
Short run
First 4 quarters after trougha 2.95 4.94 4.43 6.27
First 8 quarters after trough 0.51 5.21 0.34 6.22
Long run
First 20 quarters after peak 1.94 2.59
First 40 quarters after peak 2.44 2.97
Source:Author’s calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
a. Peaks and troughs are as deﬁned in the text.
08032—BI/BPEA Ball  12/30/99 9:19 AM  Page 199Canada the annualized growth rates over twenty quarters are 1.9 percent
and 2.6 percent, respectively—not too far from estimates of growth in
potential output. Thus the recessions that pushed output below potential
were balanced by recoveries that brought it back. In the E4, in contrast, the
twenty-quarter growth rates range from 0.4 percent to 1.1 percent. This
slow growth implies that, ﬁve years after the ﬁrst peak, output is far below
the level implied by its previous trend. Even after forty quarters, the aver-
age growth rate in the E4 is 0.67 percentage point below the average for
the United States and Canada. This implies a difference in output levels
of 6.7 percent.
UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION. Okun’s law implies that deviations of
output from trend push unemployment in the opposite direction. It implies
that the recession-recovery pattern in the NA2 should produce a rise in
unemployment and then a fall to around the initial level. The output pattern
in Europe, with a recession followed by a return of normal growth and a
still-low level of output, should cause unemployment to rise and then stay
high. These predictions, too, are borne out by the data. Figure 1 shows
200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
Table 4. Output Growth During Recoveries from Recession in the European
G-7 Countries, 1979–84
Percent change (annual rate)
United United 
Kingdom, Kingdom, France, France,
Period 1979–81 1984 1980–81 1983–84
Short run
First 4 quarters after trougha 2.39 4.42 2.78 1.50
First 8 quarters after trough 2.67 4.41 1.86 1.98
Long run
First 20 quarters after peak 0.35 0.48




First 4 quarters after trough 1.39 2.92 2.17
First 8 quarters after trough 0.66 2.13 2.99
Long run
First 20 quarters after peak 1.07 0.63
First 40 quarters after peak 2.14 1.93
Source:Author’s calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
a. Peaks and troughs are as deﬁned in the text.
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cyclical peak until eight years later. (The first peak occurs in 1979 in the
United Kingdom and in 1980 in the other countries.) In the NA2 unem-
ployment rises but then returns to its initial level or below, whereas it stays
high in the E4.
If each country had a constant NAIRU, a rise in unemployment would
cause a fall in inﬂation. In the countries where unemployment stayed high,
inflation would fall indefinitely. As figure 2 shows, however, this is not
what happened. For each country this figure shows the behavior of trend
inflation from the quarter of the first cyclical peak to eight years later.
Trend inflation is defined, as in my previous work,16 as a centered nine-
quarter moving average of consumer price inflation. The figure shows
that the six countries experienced qualitatively similar disinﬂations: inﬂa-
tion fell substantially in the first half of the 1980s and then stabilized.
The high unemployment in the E4 eventually stopped putting downward
Laurence Ball 201



















Years after prerecession peak
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, June 1996.
a. The ﬁrst number in parentheses after the country name is the unemployment rate in the peak year, and the second is the rate
eight years after the peak.
16. Ball (1994).
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higher unemployment in the E4 are not dramatically greater than those
from temporarily high unemployment in the NA2. As the ﬁgure shows, the
decrease in inﬂation varies within both groups; the average decrease over
eight years is 9.1 percentage points for the E4 and 6.8 percentage points
for the NA2.
When unemployment rises permanently without inflation constantly
falling, the NAIRU has risen. To confirm this idea, I use estimates of the
NAIRU produced by the OECD (OECD NAIRUs).
17The basic idea behind
the OECD’s procedure is to examine whether wage inflation is rising or
falling, to determine whether the NAIRU is above or below the current
level of unemployment. An initial series based on this idea is smoothed
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter and ad hoc adjustments for outliers. The
202 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999


















Years after prerecession peak
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various
issues.
a. Trend inﬂation is deﬁned as a centered nine-quarter moving average of consumer price inﬂation. The ﬁrst number in paren-
theses after the country name is the trend inflation rate in the peak quarter, and the second is the rate eight years after the peak
quarter.
17. The OECD’s technique for estimating the NAIRU was devised by Elmeskov (1993)
and is described in detail in Ball (1997).
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procedure yields NAIRU series that are intuitively plausible and fairly
close to NAIRU estimates based on other techniques.
18
Figure 3 shows estimates of the NAIRU corresponding to the unem-
ployment rates in figure 1.
19 As one would expect based on the behavior
of actual unemployment, the NAIRU is fairly stable in the United States
and Canada and rises substantially in the E4 (by more than 2 percentage
points in each country). Most of the increases occur in the ﬁve years after
the ﬁrst cyclical peak of the 1980s.
The difference in the behavior of unemployment in the E4 and the NA2
is well known. Less well known is that, as documented above, there is a
parallel difference in monetary policy: the NA2 responded more aggres-
sively to the recessions of the early 1980s. If this relationship is causal, it
implies a strong normative case for easing in response to recessions. When
policymakers see a recession beginning, a quick easing prevents the
temporary rise in unemployment from becoming permanent. Yet there is
still a substantial reduction in inflation from the contractionary forces in
the pipeline when the recession begins.
Evidence from a Larger Sample of Countries
Looking beyond the G-7 to a larger sample of OECD countries obvi-
ously provides more information to test my view. Another reason for
examining non-G-7 countries, however, is to try to disentangle the roles
of macroeconomic policy and labor market variables in explaining hys-
teresis. Economists who ignore hysteresis focus on labor market imper-
fections in explaining rising unemployment in Europe. Many believers in
hysteresis also think that labor market distortions have a role. In particular,
my own previous work finds that the extent of hysteresis depends on the
duration of unemployment benefits: a cyclical rise in unemployment has
a larger effect on the NAIRU if unemployed workers can stay on the dole
18. See Elmeskov (1993); Ball (1997).
19. I use NAIRU estimates prepared for the OECD Economic Outlook (volume 62, 1998).
These extend back to 1980. For countries with output peaks in 1979, I need a NAIRU
estimate for that year. To obtain one, I first use Elmeskov’s technique to compute my own
NAIRU series back to 1970. I use my series to compute the change in the NAIRU from
1979 to 1980 and subtract this number from the OECD’s 1980 NAIRU to get a 1979 NAIRU.
(For the periods when they overlap, my series and the OECD’s are similar but not identical,
because of data revisions and ad hoc adjustments by the OECD.)
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indefinitely.20 Thus differences in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits
as well as in the reaction of monetary policy to recessions can explain
differing trends in the NAIRU.
One cannot separate the roles of UI and monetary policy with data on
the G-7 alone. As documented above, policy in the United States and
Canada was more expansionary than policy in the E4 in the early 1980s.
But these two countries also had shorter maximum durations of UI: half a
year in both cases, compared with more than three years in France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom.21 Italy had a maximum duration of
six months, but this is just one case (and nonbelievers in hysteresis are
quick to cite other labor market distortions, such as the high cost of ﬁring
workers, to explain Italian unemployment). Fortunately, a larger sample of
countries yields substantial independent variation both in macroeconomic
policy and in labor market variables, including the duration of UI.















Years after prerecession peak
Source: Unpublished OECD data.
a. The ﬁrst number in parentheses after the country name is the NAIRU in the peak year, and the second is the NAIRU eight years
after the peak.
20. Ball (1997).
21. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991).
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MEASURING THE KEY VARIABLES. I start with the sample of twenty
OECD countries studied by Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard
Jackman and in my own previous work.
22 For one of these countries (Por-
tugal), data for the early 1980s are missing, leaving nineteen countries. For
most of these countries it is difﬁcult to obtain reliable, seasonally adjusted
data for quarterly output. Thus my analysis for the larger sample uses
annual data. This requires adjustments in the procedures for dating reces-
sions and measuring policy responses. After experimentation, I define a
“recession” as one or more consecutive years of growth below 1 percent a
year. Of the nineteen countries in the sample, two (Finland and Japan)
had no recessions by this deﬁnition, fourteen had one recession, and three
had two. This criterion appears a bit stronger than the one for selecting
recessions with quarterly data, which yields two recessions for most of
the G-7 countries. (There are cases of negative growth in quarterly data
that do not lead to year-over-year growth of less than 1 percent.)
The analysis requires a summary statistic for policy responses to reces-
sions to compare with the behavior of unemployment. Unfortunately,
Romer and Romer’s statistic—the change in the interest rate from peak to
one quarter after trough—is not easily adaptable to annual data. Measur-
ing it requires dating recessions at a quarterly frequency. Thus I use
another statistic: the largest cumulative decrease in the real interest rate
during any part of the recession’s ﬁrst year (or the average of this variable
if there are two recessions). I construct this variable with quarterly data
on short-term interest rates, which are available for all countries. The
period of maximum easing can start and end at any point in the four quar-
ters of the year. Because of this ﬂexibility, my statistic has a good chance
of capturing any quick reaction to a recession, regardless of when during
the year the recession begins. Recall that the G-7 countries that eased
policy did so quickly; thus the new variable, as well as the Romer and
Romer variable, captures the fact that they eased.
23
In investigating the effects of policy, I examine two unemployment vari-
ables. The first is the change in the NAIRU (again as estimated by the
OECD) from the peak before the recession to five years after the peak.
22. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991); Ball (1997).
23. For interest rates I use treasury bill rates where they are available. Where they are
not, I use other short-term rates from International Financial Statistics: the money market
rate for Austria, the call money rate for Denmark and Norway, the short-term facility rate
for Ireland, and the three-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) for the Netherlands.
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Recall that this change is greater than 2 percentage points for all of the
E4, and it is small or negative for the United States and Canada. This vari-
able is not ideal, however, for capturing the persistence of unemployment.
Different countries had recessions of differing severity in the early 1980s,
and hence had different short-run increases in unemployment. Even if
unemployment fed into the NAIRU to the same extent in all countries, we
would observe different increases in the NAIRU. The second variable
therefore adjusts for the size of the short-run rise in unemployment. It is
defined as a ratio, with the change in the NAIRU from peak to five years
later in the numerator and the greatest increase in actual unemployment
over any period within five years after the peak in the denominator. Intu-
itively, the denominator measures the largest temporary runup in unem-
ployment during the recession (or the runup after five years if
unemployment is still rising at that point). The ratio captures the fraction
of the rise in unemployment that feeds into the NAIRU; I call it the “degree
of hysteresis.” If this variable is zero (that is, if there is no change in the
NAIRU), there is no hysteresis. If the ratio is one (the NAIRU rises as
much as actual unemployment), there is a high degree of hysteresis.
24
I examine whether the change in the NAIRU and the degree of hys-
teresis are related to two variables: the measure of policy easing discussed
above, and the duration of unemployment benefits. The duration of bene-
ﬁts is taken from Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, who give data for the mid-
1980s. Following their method, beneﬁts of indeﬁnite duration are coded as
four years. The duration of beneﬁts is the only labor market variable found
to inﬂuence hysteresis in my previous work.
25 I have checked that none of
the other labor market variables analyzed by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
are signiﬁcant in the regressions below.
RESULTS. Table 5 presents the regressions of the change in the NAIRU
and the degree of hysteresis on the maximum policy easing and the dura-
tion of UI beneﬁts. The maximum easing and the beneﬁt duration have sig-
niﬁcant effects on both dependent variables. The maximum easing has its
24. In comparing the degree of hysteresis with the greatest policy easing, the following
bias might arise. Suppose that the NAIRU is unaffected by monetary policy, but that a greater
easing reduces the short-run increase in unemployment. In that case a greater easing reduces
the denominator of the ratio I use to measure hysteresis, thus raising the ratio, even though
there is no true hysteresis. This potential bias, however, goes in the wrong direction for
explaining my results.
25. Ball (1997).
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strongest effects in regressions where the degree of hysteresis is the depen-
dent variable: for a given initial rise in unemployment, a greater easing
greatly reduces the effect on the NAIRU. Figure 4 shows the bivariate rela-
tion between the greatest easing and the degree of hysteresis (a t-statistic
of 3.3 and an adjusted R
2 of 0.41 in the simple regression). Figure 5 reports
a variation in which the degree of hysteresis is graphed against the largest
decrease in nominal interest rates during the first year of the recession.
This scatter confirms that the variation in the behavior of the real interest
rate mainly reflects variation in nominal interest rates, not inflation. Fig-
ure 6 shows that there is also a signiﬁcant relationship between the degree
of hysteresis and benefit duration, although Italy is an outlier. When the
degree of hysteresis is regressed on both the maximum easing and beneﬁt
duration, the adjusted R
2 is 0.62. The coefficient on maximum easing
implies that raising this variable from 0 to 6 (Sweden’s value, the highest
in the sample) reduces the degree of hysteresis by 0.54. Reducing the dura-
tion of unemployment benefits from indefinite to half a year reduces the
degree of hysteresis by 0.35. Thus policymakers can reduce hysteresis
through both macroeconomic and labor market policy, and the former has
somewhat larger effects.
In figures 4 through 6, the United States and Canada stand out as the
only two countries with decreases in the NAIRU, and hence negative
degrees of hysteresis. The regressions explain this success by a combina-
tion of very short unemployment benefits and reactions to recessions that
Table 5. Estimated Equations for the Effects of Monetary Policy Easing and
Duration of UI Beneﬁts on the NAIRU and the Degree of Hysteresisa
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
change in NAIRU degree of hysteresis
5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-6
Constant 3.21 –0.12 1.18 0.69 0.12 0.39
(0.66) (0.86) (0.99) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12)
Maximum easingb –0.53 –0.42 –0.10 –0.09
(0.22) (0.20) (0.03) (0.02)
Duration of UI  0.76 0.64 0.12 0.10
(0.28) (0.25) (0.04) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.30 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.62
Source: Author’s calculations from data in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991); International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics; unpublished OECD data.
a. Data are from a sample of nineteen OECD countries in the early 1980s. Dependent variables are deﬁned in the text and cal-
culated from OECD estimates of each country’s NAIRU. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. Largest cumulative decrease in the real interest rate during the ﬁrst year of a recession.
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are larger than average, although not the very largest. Australia, Denmark,
Sweden, and Switzerland achieved positive but small degrees of hystere-
sis with longer benefit durations but greater easings than the United States
and Canada. Australia is noteworthy because it has indefinite benefits but
still achieved a low degree of hysteresis through the second-largest pol-
icy easing.
Recall that there was little relation across the G-7 countries between
policymakers’ reactions to recessions and the fall in inflation. I confirm
this result for the larger sample of countries by regressing the change in
trend inﬂation from the output peak until ﬁve years later on the maximum
policy easing. The adjusted R
2 is –0.03. Thus it again appears that easing
policy to prevent hysteresis has little inﬂationary cost.
THE EARLY 1990S. I have explored the possibility of extending the
analysis to other time periods. The early 1990s, like the early 1980s, were
Figure 4. Change in Real Interest Rates and Degree of Hysteresis in Seventeen OECD
Countries, 1979–85
Degree of hysteresisa























Largest cumulative decrease in real interest rate in ﬁrst year of early 1980s recession
(percentage points)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, June 1996; International Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Statistics; unpublished OECD data.
a. The degree of hysteresis is a ratio, with the change in the NAIRU from the year before the ﬁrst 1980s recession to ﬁve years
later as the numerator, and the largest increase in actual unemployment during the same period as the denominator.
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a period when most OECD countries experienced recessions. At first
glance it appears that this period also provides evidence that monetary pol-
icy helps determine whether hysteresis arises. By far the largest increase in
the NAIRU in the 1990s occurred in Finland: the OECD NAIRU for Fin-
land rose from 7.0 percent in 1990 to 12.8 percent in 1995. The rise in the
NAIRU followed an extremely deep recession: output grew by only
0.1 percent in 1990 and then fell by 7.3 percent, 3.6 percent, and 1.2 per-
cent in 1991, 1992, and 1993, respectively. Many accounts blame the
recession on external shocks, especially the collapse of trade with the
Soviet Union. In any case, monetary policy was extremely passive during
the recession. The central bank held the nominal interest rate constant
throughout 1990 and 1991 and raised it a percentage point in 1992. Inﬂa-
tion fell sharply during the recession, and so the real interest rate rose from
1.5 percent in the first quarter of 1990 to 7.0 percent in the fourth quarter
Figure 5. Change in Nominal Interest Rates and Degree of Hysteresis in Seventeen
OECD Countries, 1979–85
Degree of hysteresisa























Largest cumulative decrease in nominal interest rate in ﬁrst year of early 1980s recession
(percentage points)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, June 1996; International Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, various issues; unpublished OECD data.
a. The degree of hysteresis is deﬁned as in ﬁgure 4.
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of 1992. Policymakers were reluctant to cut interest rates because they
were struggling to support the currency in order to remain in the EMS.
Finland in the 1990s is a good example of a passive response to a recession
producing a rise in the NAIRU.
The second largest rise in the NAIRU occurred in Sweden, where it rose
3.5 percentage points from 1990 to 1995. One can tell a story about pas-
sive policy here as well, although the evidence is less clear-cut.
26
Figure 6. Duration of Unemployment Insurance Beneﬁts and Degree of Hysteresis in
Seventeen OECD Countries, 1979–85
Degree of hysteresisa























Duration of unemployment insurance (years)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook, June 1996; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991);
unpublished OECD data.
a. The degree of hysteresis is deﬁned as in ﬁgure 4.
26. Sweden is one of the countries where, as discussed below, the erratic behavior of
policy makes it difﬁcult to measure the degree of easing. Swedish output fell in 1990, 1991,
and 1992. The largest policy easing during this recession was by 2.5 percentage points: the
real interest rate fell by that amount in the first three quarters of 1990. This value for the
largest easing is above average for recessions in the 1990s. In this case, however, the largest
easing gives a misleading picture of the policy stance over the course of the recession. The
initial easing was followed by a huge tightening: the real interest rate rose by 11.5 percentage
points from the third quarter of 1990 to the third quarter of 1991, during the middle of
the recession.
08032—BI/BPEA Ball  12/30/99 9:19 AM  Page 210On the other hand, in contrast to the early 1980s, there is no clear
relation across the sample of OECD countries between hysteresis and sim-
ple measures of policy easing. The regression of the degree of hysteresis
on the largest easing, defined as in table 5, yields an insignificant coeffi-
cient. The coefficient for the duration of unemployment benefits is also
insignificant. The weak results reflect the fact that most changes in the
NAIRU were small: after Sweden and Finland, the largest rise was 1.7 per-
centage points in Switzerland. Countries such as Belgium and Spain had
both indeﬁnite UI beneﬁts and apparently passive responses to recessions,
yet did not experience large rises in the NAIRU.
The explanation for these results is not clear. One possible factor is the
initial level of the NAIRU. The increases in the NAIRU in the early 1980s
occurred from initial levels around 6 percent or lower, whereas many
countries started the 1990s with NAIRUs of 10 percent or higher. Perhaps
the NAIRU does not rise without limit in response to adverse shocks, even
with passive policy. Another possibility is that measures of policy easing
have greater noise in the 1990s than in the 1980s. In the 1990s, policy in
some countries switched erratically between tightness and ease (partly as
a consequence of the 1992 crisis in the European Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism), and this makes measures of easing less robust. In a number of coun-
tries, different measures (for example, variables based on quarterly and
annual data) yield different pictures of policy.
What Reduces Unemployment? 1985–97
From the 1960s through the mid-1980s, unemployment trended upward
throughout the OECD. The average unemployment rate in the OECD
excluding the United States peaked at 8.0 percent in 1984–86. Although
unemployment rose less in some countries than in others, no country
experienced a major fall in the NAIRU. Since 1985 the experiences of the
OECD countries have been more diverse. Unemployment has continued to
rise in some countries but has fallen significantly in others. This experi-
ence can shed light on the question of how countries can reduce the
NAIRU. In particular, one can ask whether hysteresis is symmetric—
whether demand expansions reduce the NAIRU in the same way that con-
tractions increase it. One can also examine the role of labor market reforms
in reducing unemployment.
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Successes and Failures in Reducing Unemployment
The possibilities for reducing the NAIRU depend on its initial level. If
unemployment is already low, it may be difficult to reduce it further. As
of 1985, to take some extreme examples, there must have been some way
for Spain to reduce its NAIRU below 18 percent, yet the same policies
would not have reduced Switzerland’s NAIRU much below 0.5 percent.
In this section I focus on countries where unemployment in 1985 was
high enough for policymakers to consider it a major problem. Ten coun-
tries had OECD NAIRUs above 8 percent in 1985. Figure 7 shows the evo-
lution of the NAIRU in these countries from 1985 through 1997.
I divide the countries in figure 7 into two groups. The first group
consists of the “success” countries that reduced their NAIRUs signifi-
cantly: Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. In
these countries the NAIRU fell by amounts ranging from 2.2 to 3.0 per-
centage points. These are the largest NAIRU decreases in the OECD; the
next largest decrease is that of the United States, which reduced its NAIRU
by 0.9 percentage point from 6.5 percent in 1985.
The second group, the “failures,” has six members: Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Italy, and Spain. In these countries the NAIRU either
rose from 1985 to 1997 or fell by a trivial amount (0.2 percentage point
or less). What did these countries do wrong, or what did the four successes
do right, to explain the different experiences?
27
Labor Market Reforms
Before discussing the role of demand in unemployment successes and
failures, I consider a factor emphasized by previous authors, namely, labor
market reforms. Just as the conventional wisdom blames high unemploy-
ment on distortions in labor markets, so, too, many commentators ascribe
successes in reducing unemployment to policies that reduce such distor-
tions. For example, the success of the United Kingdom is often attributed
to Thatcher’s labor market reforms, and that of the Netherlands to its adop-
tion of a “third way” in labor relations. In my view, however, the role of
labor market reforms in the success stories is exaggerated.
27. If we extended the analysis through 1999, Denmark might join the successes, because
unemployment there has fallen sharply in the last two years. Future work should update the
analysis of Denmark.
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CHANGES IN MEASURES OF LABOR MARKET DISTORTIONS. One way to
investigate the role of reforms is to examine quantitative series on various
labor market distortions. The most prominent series are the ones produced
for the OECD Jobs Study and by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman.
28 I will
emphasize the OECD data because they contain the most detail about vari-
ation over time.
There is controversy about whether the OECD and the Layard, Nick-
ell, and Jackman variables explain cross-country differences in unemploy-
ment levels. The developers of the series claim that they do, but others
criticize their results as lacking robustness.
29 In any case, it is clear that the
series are of little help in explaining the changes over time in unemploy-
ment that I seek to understand here. The main reason is simply that the
variables do not change much. For example, two well-known OECD series
for 1983–95, namely, country rankings for stringency of employment pro-
Figure 7. Change in the NAIRU in Ten OECD Countries, 1985–97a
Percentage points
1997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987
















Source: Unpublished OECD data.
a. The ﬁrst number in parentheses is the initial value of the NAIRU and the second is the ﬁnal value.
28. OECD (1994a, updated in Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta, 1998); Layard, Nickell,
and Jackman (1991, updated in Nickell, 1997).
29. For example, Junankar and Madsen (1996); Blanchard (1997). 
08032—BI/BPEA Ball  12/30/99 9:19 AM  Page 213214 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
tection and expenditure on active labor market policies, do not change at
all. Two others, the average replacement rate for unemployment benefits
and the “tax wedge,” change only slightly. For these two variables, table 6
presents data for 1983 and 1995. The 1983 levels of the replacement rate
range from less than 1 percent up to 56 percent of previous earnings. The
largest decreases in the rate from 1983 to 1995 are by 5 percentage points
in Belgium and by 4 percentage points in the United Kingdom and Spain.
The largest increases are considerably larger, but not huge: Portugal and
Italy, with low initial rates, increased them by 28 and 19 percentage points,
respectively. Furthermore, as these examples suggest, there is no signifi-
cant correlation between changes in replacement rates and changes in the
NAIRU. Changes in the tax wedge are also small and uncorrelated with
changes in the NAIRU. One gets similar results with the labor market vari-
ables constructed by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman.
30
A partial qualification to this argument concerns the use of incomes
policies. In contrast to reducing unemployment benefits or tax wedges,
introducing incomes policies is arguably a step away from a Walrasian
labor market. But one can make a case that incomes policies have
contributed to lower unemployment in some countries. The most famous
part of the Dutch experience is the Wassenaar Agreement, a 1982 accord
on wage restraint accepted by the Dutch unions. Ireland also introduced
national pay agreements in 1988. Thus in two of the four success countries
there was a signiﬁcant shift in institutions, and each occurred a few years
before the NAIRU started falling. On the other hand, the other country that
has adopted incomes policies since 1980 is Italy, which adopted them in
1992 without obvious beneﬁts to date. And Spain had incomes policies in
place from 1977 to 1987, a period during which its NAIRU rose steeply.
31
ANECDOTES ABOUT SUCCESS COUNTRIES. Quantitative labor market
variables are crude tools for measuring labor market reform. Some impor-
tant policy changes might not be captured by numbers such as those in
30. Recall that this paper uses the Layard, Nickell, and Jackman series for the duration
of unemployment benefits. For most countries this variable is constant over time. For the
Netherlands the reported duration decreases from indefinite in 1983–88 to two years in
1989–94. However, other sources suggest that this coding is incorrect. For example, the
detailed data on 1991 beneﬁt levels in the OECD Jobs Study show that the Netherlands has
high replacement rates for the third through the ﬁfth year of unemployment.
31. See Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998) for a history of incomes policies in the
OECD.
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table 6. Indeed, many discussions of the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands suggest that important reforms have occurred. For example, the
Economist reports that:
Once an extreme example of Eurosclerosis, some now see the Netherlands as a
model for the rest of Europe. Workers have accepted small pay rises in return for
more jobs; rules on part-time and temporary jobs have been relaxed; and social
security taxes have been trimmed.32
In a survey of labor market rigidities in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Horst Siebert discusses:
the approach of the British and the Dutch, where labor market institutions have
been signiﬁcantly overhauled, and unemployment rates have dropped as a result.
Since the mid-1980s, the Netherlands implemented wage restraints, causing a
fall in the real labor cost per unit of output. Moreover, it restructured the welfare
state. . . . Between 1985 and 1987, the government beneﬁts for unemployment,
sickness, and disability were scaled back from 80 to 70 percent of the previous
wage. More restrictive definitions of disability were put in place in 1993. In
1994, employers were made directly liable for wages of sick employees in their
first six weeks off the job, rather than the costs being borne by government,
and employer contributions for sick leave were for the ﬁrst time tied to the sick-
Table 6. Measures of Labor Market Distortion in Ten OECD Countries, 1983 and 1995
Percent
Replacement rate
of UI beneﬁts Tax wedge
Country 1983 1995 1983 1995
Successes
Ireland 18.2 26.3 40.1 38.4
Netherlands 47.4 45.8 52.0 45.6
Portugal 7.2 35.4 32.3 34.3
United Kingdom 21.7 17.7 38.2 33.3
Failures
Belgium 43.6 38.7 54.1 53.5
Canada 29.2 27.2 25.6 31.4
Denmark 56.3 67.4 46.5 45.2
France 31.1 37.4 43.4 43.6
Italy 0.5 19.3 50.5 49.9
Spain 35.7 31.7 38.0 38.8
Source: Unpublished OECD data.
32. “The Good (and Bad) Model Guide,” Economist,April 10, 1999, p. 68.
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ness record of the firm. From 1985–96, the Netherlands experienced strong
employment growth of 1.8 percent per year.33
Siebert continues with a similar list of reforms in the United Kingdom.
These include a series of laws restricting the power of unions; a weaken-
ing of employment protection (specifically, an extension from one to two
years of the time until tenure); and the Restart program, which pressures
UI recipients to ﬁnd jobs.
I do not find such discussions convincing, for several reasons. Most
obviously, they do not explain the successes of Portugal or Ireland, nei-
ther of which is commonly viewed as a major labor market reformer. Blan-
chard and Juan Jimeno try hard to find labor market reforms that
distinguish Portugal from high-unemployment Spain, and fail.34
Second, most of the Dutch and British reforms seem minor. Changing
the replacement rate from 80 percent to 70 percent and lengthening the
waiting period before a worker gains employment protection are changes
at the margins of labor market institutions. They move the United King-
dom and the Netherlands only a small fraction of the way toward the more
flexible institutions of the United States. In my view, narratives such as
Siebert’s conﬁrm rather than refute the message from quantitative indices
that labor market variables do not change much over time.
Third and most important, countries that failed to reduce unemployment
also adopted labor market reforms. In literally all of the ten countries I
examine, policymakers recognized that high unemployment was a prob-
lem, blamed it on labor market institutions, and passed legislation to
address it. In many cases the reforms seem as big or bigger than those of
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. One example is Spain. Like the
Netherlands, Spain reduced its maximum replacement rate from 80 per-
cent to 70 percent. Legislation in 1985 reduced the force of firing restric-
tions by allowing more temporary and part-time work. In 1992, grants to
people in training programs were greatly reduced, because policymakers
believed the programs drew people away from employment. A 1994
reform package included easier layoffs and less regulation of hours and job
tasks. If Spanish unemployment had then fallen substantially, one could
have explained this success by pointing to the same kinds of reforms used
to explain the improvement in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
33. Siebert (1997, p. 42).
34. Blanchard and Jimeno (1995).
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Indeed, OECD country surveys of Spain from the late 1980s, when Span-
ish unemployment dipped, sometimes credit the 1985 reforms,
35 but the
surveys stop discussing these reforms when unemployment rises again in
the 1990s. The Spanish reforms were not huge, and they had only modest
impacts on quantitative labor market variables—but the same is true of
the British and Dutch reforms.
Belgium and Canada are two more countries that have undertaken a
number of reforms. OECD country surveys of Belgium report a series of
UI reforms in the 1990s,
36 including beneﬁt reductions and efforts to pres-
sure the unemployed to ﬁnd jobs, as in the British Restart program. Canada
also modiﬁed its UI system at several points in the 1990s, cutting beneﬁts
and directing the savings to active labor market policies.
In my view, most analysts of the success stories start with the premise
that labor market reforms are the explanation, and then look for examples
of reforms to support their position. They ﬁnd examples, but only because
all of the countries that started with high unemployment have undertaken
some kind of reform. There appears to be little correlation between the
extent of reforms and changes in the NAIRU.
Decreases in the NAIRU and Runups in Inﬂation
The rest of this section argues that demand expansions played an impor-
tant role in the success stories, and that a lack of similar expansions helps
explain the failures. Demand was stronger in the success countries both
because of the behavior of monetary policy and because of shocks arising
from nonpolicy sources. Demand expansions pushed unemployment rates
in the success countries beneath their NAIRUs in 1985. Because of
hysteresis, low actual unemployment pulled down the NAIRUs over time.
To tell this story, I ﬁrst examine the behavior of inﬂation in the success
and failure countries, as measured by the quarterly series for trend inﬂation
used earlier—a nine-quarter centered moving average. If demand expan-
sions push unemployment below the current NAIRU, then by definition
inﬂation should rise. Thus my interpretation of the success stories implies
that falling unemployment should be accompanied by rising inﬂation.
This prediction is borne out in three of the four success countries. To
make this point, table 7 reports the magnitude and dates of the largest
35. See, for example, OECD (1989a, pp. 15–19).
36. See, for example, OECD (1994b, pp. 54–56).
08032—BI/BPEA Ball  12/30/99 9:19 AM  Page 217218 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
runup in trend inflation (from any quarter to any subsequent quarter)
between 1985 and 1997 in each of the success and the failure countries. All
ten countries experienced an inflation runup at some point (that is, trend
inflation did not decrease monotonically from 1985 to 1997). In all cases
the largest runup occurred early in the period: the starting dates range from
1985 to 1987 and the end dates from 1987 to 1991, reflecting the expan-
sions in most OECD countries in the late 1980s. The sizes of the inﬂation
runups vary considerably across countries, however. In the six countries
where unemployment did not fall substantially, the largest inﬂation runups
range from 0.9 percentage point (France) to 2.6 percentage points (Bel-
gium), with an average of 1.8 percentage points. In contrast, the largest
runups in the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom were 3.8,
4.1, and 5.6 percentage points, respectively. These inﬂation increases in a
period without adverse supply shocks imply that demand pushed unem-
ployment below the initial NAIRU. The only success country without a
large inﬂation runup is Ireland, where the largest runup was 1.2 percentage
points.
The absence of a large inflation runup in Ireland suggests that special
factors are needed to explain that country’s success. Part of the story
involves the timing of the fall in the NAIRU. As shown in figure 7, the
NAIRU did not start to fall in Ireland until 1991, whereas it fell in the late
1980s in the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Thus the
three countries with the largest inﬂation runups in the late 1980s also had
the largest falls in the NAIRU during that period. For the ten countries,
Table 7. Largest Runups in Inﬂation in Ten OECD Countries, 1985–97
Largest rise in trend inﬂation
Country (percentage points)a Period










Source:Author’s calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
a. Trend inﬂation is calculated as a centered nine-quarter moving average of consumer price inﬂation.
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from 1985 to 1991, by which year all the countries had ended their largest
inflation runup. The figure shows a strong relationship between inflation
rises and NAIRU decreases. The relationship deteriorates somewhat when
the period is extended to 1997 (not shown), because the Irish NAIRU fell
from 1991 to 1997 without an inﬂation runup. The 1990s Irish experience
is thus what requires a special story.
An important point is that the inflation runups in the Netherlands,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom were not permanent. From 1985 to
1997, trend inﬂation rose less than 1 percentage point in the Netherlands,
and it fell in the other three success countries (and in the six failures). In
the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, inflation rose as
unemployment started falling in the late 1980s. But these countries disin-
ﬂated in the 1990s, and the NAIRU kept falling (in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom) or remained roughly constant (in Portugal). These facts
suggest that demand expansions helped reduce the NAIRU, but that a
permanent reduction in the NAIRU does not require a permanent rise in
inﬂation.
Monetary Policy and Demand in the Ten Countries
Next I examine the economic histories of the ten countries to learn more
about the causes of unemployment changes. I rely primarily on discussions
in the OECD country surveys and on data on interest rates and other
variables.
The analysis yields two broad conclusions. First, as suggested by the
inflation evidence, most of the success countries experienced demand
expansions that reduced unemployment in the late 1980s. These expan-
sions were not caused by intentional easings of monetary policy. Instead,
the economies overheated because of a variety of nonmonetary shocks
to demand.
Second, differences in monetary policy also help explain unemploy-
ment successes and failures. The details of policy differ considerably from
country to country, but overall policy was tighter in the failure countries.
The success countries sometimes tightened policy, but only when the econ-
omy was overheating and inﬂation was rising. Indeed, policymakers were
often slow to tighten in these situations. And when inﬂation stopped rising,
policy eased. In contrast, the failure countries tightened policy during peri-
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ods of stable or falling inflation and kept policy tight for substantial peri-
ods after recessions began. As in the early 1980s, tight policy was moti-
vated by the desire to reduce inﬂation and to support currencies.
Figures 9 and 10 present some of the data that I use in the discussion.
For each country I show the path of a five-quarter moving average of the
real interest rate, as defined above. This interest rate series shows trends in
monetary policy toward tightness or ease. The ﬁgures also show the point
at which trend inﬂation peaked in each country after its largest runup (the
solid vertical line), the output peak before each recession (the dashed ver-
tical line), and, for the four successes, the period when the NAIRU was
decreasing. Recessions are dated with quarterly data for the G-7 coun-
tries and with annual data for the other countries, using the methods
described above.
UNITED KINGDOM. The United Kingdom experienced a strong,
demand-driven expansion in the late 1980s. From 1986 through 1988,
Figure 8. Inﬂation Runups and Changes in the NAIRU in Ten OECD Countries,
1985–91






















Largest rise in trend inﬂation (percentage points)a
Source:Author’s calculations from data in International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; unpub-
lished OECD data.
a. Trend inﬂation is deﬁned as a centered nine-quarter moving average of consumer price inﬂation.
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annual growth averaged 4.7 percent. Chapter titles in the OECD surveys of
the country change from “A Booming Economy” (in the 1987/88 survey)
to “An Overheating Economy” (in the 1988/89 survey).
37 The consensus
explanation for the expansion was a boom in borrowing, and hence in con-
sumption and investment, due to a combination of ﬁnancial liberalization,
high confidence, and high asset prices. Fiscal policy was also expansion-




















































Source:Author’s calculations based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
a. The trend real interest rate is a centered five-quarter moving average of the real interest rate as defined in the text. Shading
represents periods during which the NAIRU was falling.
b. Trend inﬂation is a centered nine-quarter moving average of consumer price inﬂation.
37. OECD (1988, 1989b).
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Source:Author’s calculations based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
a. The trend real interest rate is deﬁned as in ﬁgure 9.
b. Trend inﬂation is deﬁned as in ﬁgure 9.
c. Same quarter as trend inﬂation peak.
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ary. The Bank of England was slow to recognize the overheating because
it overestimated potential output. Thus it did not tighten policy until after
inflation had started to rise. In figure 9 the smoothed real interest rate
does not turn up until 1988.
Policy finally tightened in 1988 and 1989; as a result, trend inflation
peaked in 1989 and a recession began in 1990. Shortly before the reces-
sion, policy as measured by the trend interest rate started to ease. The
OECD surveys also report substantial easing in response to the recession.
The policy easing was interrupted, but only temporarily, by efforts to sup-
port the pound. When the United Kingdom left the EMS in 1992, the inter-
est rate resumed its downward course and the pound fell sharply,
producing rapid growth.
38
Actual unemployment fell sharply in the late 1980s expansion, and the
OECD NAIRU for the United Kingdom began drifting down. The mone-
tary tightening in the late 1980s and loosening in the early 1990s produced
a temporary rise in unemployment, but the NAIRU continued to fall. Thus
the experience of the United Kingdom in the early 1990s was like that of
the United States in the early 1980s: policy easing in response to a reces-
sion prevented hysteresis. The recession nonetheless reduced inflation,
reversing the inﬂation runup of the late 1980s.
PORTUGAL. Portugal also overheated in the late 1980s: output grew at
an annual rate of 5.0 percent in 1986–90 as inflation rose and unemploy-
ment fell. Here the causes included expansionary fiscal policy and acces-
sion to the European Union, which produced transfers to the government
and an investment boom financed by capital inflows. As in the United
Kingdom, monetary policy failed to offset the demand expansion. For Por-
tugal in the 1980s, interest rates are a poor guide to the stance of policy,
because quantitative credit controls were the main policy tool. Portugal
tried to tighten policy to reduce demand, but capital inflows reduced the
effectiveness of credit controls.
38. We can also measure the policy response to the early-1990s recession using methods
used earlier in this paper. The largest monetary easing as deﬁned in table 5 was 3.9 percentage
points: the real interest rate fell that much from the first quarter to the fourth quarter of
1990. This value of the largest easing is the highest for any OECD country in the early 1990s.
A caveat is that, as discussed above, measures of easing are not robust in the early 1990s.
When one dates the recession with quarterly data, as in tables 1 and 2, the fall in the real
interest rate from peak to one quarter after the trough is only 0.6 percentage point. On the
other hand, the fall from peak to three quarters after the trough (the fourth quarter of 1992, the
quarter after the United Kingdom left the EMS) is 2.6 percentage points.
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Near the inﬂation peak in 1990, Portugal joined the EMS and switched
to the interest rate as its policy instrument. It tightened policy, producing
a recession and falling inflation. At that point Portugal faced the typical
conﬂict between a desire for easier policy to promote recovery and a desire
to support the currency. OECD surveys from the early 1990s show Portu-
gal struggling to balance these objectives.
39 The country took a middle-
of-the-road course, preferring exchange market interventions to interest
rate increases, and devaluing several times, but remaining in the EMS.
This middling policy produced a middling outcome for unemployment.
Actual unemployment rose sharply and then fell somewhat. The NAIRU
did not continue to fall in the 1990s, as in the United Kingdom, but Por-
tugal did not give up the gains from the late-1980s expansion.
NETHERLANDS. The Netherlands experienced a long expansion starting
in the mid-1980s but never overheated as much as did the United Kingdom
or Portugal. Trend inflation rose slowly from –0.5 percent to 3.2 percent
over four years (from the first quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of
1991). Rising inflation did not provoke an immediate policy response,
however, because the level of inflation was still low. The expansion was
reinforced in the early 1990s by tax cuts and the reunification boom in
nearby Germany. Thus strong growth continued through 1992, whereas
most of the OECD countries were in recession by 1990 or 1991. In addi-
tion, the boom ended with a soft landing: growth slowed below 1 percent
in 1993 but never became negative. This experience reflects the fact that
the Netherlands’business cycle was aligned with Germany’s, so that mim-
icking German monetary policy in order to remain in the EMS was not
costly. Since the economy was strong in 1991–92, it was appropriate to
raise interest rates along with Germany; the Netherlands avoided the
dilemma of France and the United Kingdom, where the need for tighten-
ing came when the economy was already in recession.
Thus the story of the Netherlands is not one of dramatic overheating,
but rather of a long expansion and an absence of the sharp recessions that
occurred in most OECD countries. This averages out to a high level of
demand stimulus over 1985–97. This story fits the behavior of inflation:
the Netherlands is the only one of the ten countries, successes or failures,
where trend inﬂation rose from 1985 to 1997 (albeit slightly). (To return to
an earlier point: rising inflation is not what one would expect if the
39. See, for example, OECD (1995, pp. 25–28).
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Wassenaar Agreement on wage restraint were really what is special about
the Netherlands.)
THE SIX FAILURES. As suggested by their small inﬂation runups, the six
failure countries did not experience overheatings like those in the success
countries. Nonetheless, they all tightened monetary policy at various
points. For four of the failures—Belgium, Denmark, France, and Italy—
the contractionary stance of policy is clear from the interest rate series in
figure 10. These countries saw sharp increases in rates that occurred
largely after the mild runups in inflation, when inflation was stable or
falling. These tightenings were motivated by exchange rate concerns and
desires for further disinﬂation. In the success countries, by contrast, tight-
enings occurred only when inﬂation was rising substantially.
In the cases of Canada and Spain, the interest rates in figure 10 do not
tell a clear story. However, historical accounts make it clear that these
countries pursued highly contractionary policies. The Bank of Canada
adopted its famous price stability goal in 1989 and reduced inflation by
almost 5 percentage points from 1990 to 1993. This tighter policy was
motivated by a shift in policy objectives rather than by overheating in the
economy. According to the OECD surveys, the price stability goal caused
Canada to keep policy tight despite the deep recession of the early 1990s.
40
Spain experienced an unusually long, steady disinflation during much
of the 1980s and 1990s.
41 The reason is summarized in a 1992 OECD sur-
vey: “following the 1982 devaluation, monetary policy shifted toward
restriction and has remained tight overall since then.”
42 In 1994 the OECD
reported “tight monetary conditions” despite a “deepening recession”;
the tightness was motivated by “anti-inflation goals” and a desire to sup-
port the currency.
43 In 1995 Spain was still adopting inﬂation targets call-
ing for further disinﬂation.
IRELAND. The Irish success story is quite recent. Actual unemployment
was 15.7 percent in 1993 and has fallen sharply since then. In some ways
Ireland’s experience fits my story well. Monetary policy has been fairly
expansionary: although Ireland participated in the EMS, it devalued by
10 percent at the start of 1993, and real interest rates fell sharply over
1993–95. Output growth has been very strong, averaging about 5 percent a
40. See, for example, OECD (1991, pp. 45–50).
41. See Ball (1997).
42. OECD (1992, p. 55).
43. OECD (1994c). 
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year from 1987 through 1996, and the lowest annual rate of growth in
this period was 2.2 percent in 1988.
From the perspective of my story, the unusual part of the Irish experi-
ence is the behavior of inﬂation. Trend inﬂation fell from 3.6 percent in the
first quarter of 1990 to 2.0 percent in the fourth quarter of 1992 and then
stayed close to 2 percent. In contrast to the Netherlands, Portugal, and the
United Kingdom, Ireland experienced no inflation runup to signal over-
heating in the economy. And indeed, serious overheating apparently did
not occur. Ireland’s rapid growth can be explained by a supply-side mira-
cle: since the mid-1980s, total factor productivity has grown much faster
than in other OECD countries. Aggregate demand is not the primary
source of the rapid growth accompanying the fall in the NAIRU. (Accord-
ing to the OECD, the causes of rapid productivity growth include “for-
eign direct investment by multinational companies; an expanding
well-qualified labor force; and a social consensus on pay policy that has
left management free to concentrate on improving efﬁciency.”)
44
A natural hypothesis is that Ireland’s rapid productivity growth is some-
how the cause of its falling NAIRU. If one looks outside the OECD, there
is another country that suggests this idea: Chile, where rapid productivity
growth in the 1990s has been accompanied by falling inflation and
unemployment. The channels through which productivity growth might
affect unemployment are not clear, but one possibility is wage demands.
Authors such as Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs blame rising
unemployment in many countries in the 1970s on the productivity slow-
down.
45 They argue that demands for wage increases did not adjust imme-
diately to the fall in productivity growth, and this caused an unfavorable
shift in the unemployment-inflation tradeoff. Perhaps the reverse has
occurred in Ireland and Chile, with wage demands not adjusting fully to
productivity pickups. Another paper should investigate this idea in detail.
Explaining the Results
So far this paper has documented some empirical regularities about
the forces leading to increases and decreases in the NAIRU. What can
explain these facts?
44. OECD (1997, p. 13).
45. Bruno and Sachs (1985).
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The Modeling Approach
When previous authors have analyzed hysteresis, they have usually
focused on channels through which current employment is affected by past
employment. I take a somewhat different approach: I treat employment
as exogenous and analyze the effects of employment movements on inﬂa-
tion. The reason is that the relation between employment and inflation—
the Phillips curve—is the part of conventional macroeconomic models
from which hysteresis theories must depart. If one looks at the real econ-
omy alone, textbook models are entirely consistent with the idea that a
change in demand causes a permanent change in output and employment.
If output is determined by an IS curve, it can fall for an indefinite period
if the central bank raises the real interest rate and keeps it high, or if the
central bank keeps the interest rate constant when the IS curve shifts. In
textbook models, the forces that return output and employment to long-run
equilibria are the Phillips curve and the behavior of policymakers. A devi-
ation of output from its natural level causes accelerating inﬂation or deﬂa-
tion, and sensible policymakers respond by pushing output back.
46
My model allows for hysteresis by modifying the textbook Phillips
curve. The modiﬁcation builds on an idea in previous work: the distinction
between short- and long-term unemployment. Many authors argue that
something happens to the long-term unemployed that makes them unlikely
to ﬁnd jobs: their human capital deteriorates, employers view them suspi-
ciously, or they lose attachment to the labor force. Nickell and W. Franz
argue that, because the long-term unemployed do not threaten to take jobs
from other workers, they do not put downward pressure on wages.
47 Thus
the long-term unemployed do not affect inflation: the Phillips curve
includes only short-term unemployment. Under this assumption there is a
unique level of short-term unemployment consistent with stable inﬂation,
but total unemployment can settle at any level.
46. This argument assumes that the central bank can hold the real interest rate at an arbitrary
level indeﬁnitely. In some rational expectations models this is an invalid assumption: even if
policymakers can set nominal rates, jumps in inflation force the real interest rate to its
equilibrium level. However, in textbook models—and in reality—there is enough inertia in
inflation so that policymakers can control the real rate by adjusting the nominal rate. (This
inertia might disappear if there were ever-accelerating inflation or deflation, but no such
outcome will occur in my model.)
47. Nickell (1987); Franz (1987).
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This idea is supported by econometric evidence provided by Franz,
Nickell, and the OECD.
48 These studies estimate Phillips curves with sep-
arate terms for short- and long-term unemployment and find that the lat-
ter has little effect on inflation. This result is consistent with the fact that
increases in the NAIRU in most countries have come disproportionately
from increases in long-term unemployment. The equilibrium level of
short-term unemployment appears relatively stable.
Although my model builds on previous work, I tailor it to fit the
particular aspects of hysteresis uncovered in this paper. The first fact to
explain is the result that a policy response to a recession can prevent a
permanent rise in unemployment without a major cost in inflation. The
second is the result that hysteresis is reversible: a demand expansion can
reduce the NAIRU.
Assumptions
Here I describe the details of the model in several steps.
DEMAND-DETERMINED EMPLOYMENT. Let the size of the labor force
be normalized to one, and let E be the level of employment. Total unem-
ployment is 1 – E. As discussed above, I consider an exogenous path of
employment. One can interpret employment as being determined by
aggregate spending, which in turn is determined by an IS equation. For the
purposes of my theoretical analysis, it does not matter whether the demand
shifts causing employment movements are caused by monetary policy or
by shifts in the IS curve.
49
SHORT- AND LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT. Here I describe how move-
ments in employment affect short-term and long-term unemployment.
Short-term unemployment, S, is deﬁned as workers in their ﬁrst period of
unemployment. Long-term unemployment is 1 – E – S. A “period” should
probably be interpreted as a year, since applied work usually deﬁnes long-
term unemployment as unemployment beyond a year.
48. Franz (1987); Nickell (1987); OECD Employment Outlook, 1993.
49. One can find deeper foundations for my approach in macroeconomic models with
imperfect competition (see Romer, 1996, chapter 6). In these models, firms set prices in
advance each period, so output is determined by demand. Firms are happy to accommodate
increased demand with higher production and employment because price exceeds marginal
cost. I assume the markup is sufﬁciently large that it is proﬁtable to hire workers even if, as
assumed below, ﬁrms pay small retraining costs for some of them.
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new jobs are created, with workers hired from the unemployment pool. If
E falls, then E–1 – E jobs are destroyed, and that many workers become
unemployed. Finally, following search and efficiency-wage models, I
assume a ﬁxed rate of breakups of employer-employee matches in existing
jobs. The breakup rate is b. The number of jobs continuing from the pre-
vious period is min(E, E–1), so the number of matches that break up is
b[min(E, E–1)]. I assume that it takes time to ﬁnd a new job: workers whose
matches break up cannot move to other jobs in the same period. Thus these
workers become unemployed, and their jobs are filled from the previous
period’s unemployed.
Given the path of total employment, these assumptions determine short-
term unemployment:
(1) S = bE–1 if E ≥ E–1
= E–1 – (1 – b)E if E < E–1 .
If employment does not decrease, the only workers in their ﬁrst period of
unemployment are those whose matches break up. If employment
decreases, the short-term unemployed are those whose jobs are destroyed
(E–1 – E) plus those separated from the remaining jobs (bE).
A steady state for the economy requires that E = E–1, which implies
that S = bE. Thus, in steady state, the ratio of short-term unemployment
to employment equals the separation rate b.
THE PHILLIPS CURVE. The central assumption of the model is the
Phillips curve. It is a conventional accelerationist equation, except that
only short-term unemployment enters:
(2) π = π–1 – a(S/E – b), a > 0,
where π is inflation and π–1 is lagged inflation. According to this equa-
tion, inflation is constant when the ratio S/E is at its steady-state level of b.
Movements in S/E cause inﬂation to move in the opposite direction.
As discussed above, this assumption is motivated by the idea that the
long-term unemployed do not put pressure on wages. A number of speciﬁc
labor market models might generate a Phillips curve like that in equation
(2). For concreteness, I sketch a modiﬁcation of a standard efﬁciency-wage
model. Following Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz, suppose that wages are
set at the level needed to elicit effort from workers, and that this level
depends on the employment prospects of a worker who loses his or her
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job.50 If reemployment prospects improve, wages must be raised to main-
tain effort, and wage increases feed into higher inﬂation.51
Suppose also that, as in work by Blanchard and Peter Diamond,52 ﬁrms
“rank” job applicants by their unemployment spells. When ﬁrms ﬁll vacan-
cies, they first hire those unemployed workers with the shortest spells of
unemployment and then work up. Blanchard and Diamond discuss the
evidence for such behavior, such as the dropoff in reemployment rates as
unemployment spells lengthen. Firms behave this way because it is costly
to hire the long-term unemployed—they need retraining, or it is costly to
recruit them because they do not search intensively. Even if the cost of hir-
ing the long-term unemployed is small, it still produces ranking because
firms must pay the same wage to all workers. Workers are identical once
the recruiting or retraining cost is paid, so they require the same wage to
deter shirking.
These assumptions about efﬁciency wages and ranking imply a Phillips
curve like equation (2). An employed worker knows that, if he loses his
job, he will be one of the short-term unemployed. That worker’s chances
for reemployment depend on the number of short-term unemployed, but
not on the long-term unemployed, because they are behind the worker in
the job queue. Thus only short-term unemployment affects wage setting
and inﬂation.
REEMPLOYMENT OF THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED. The above
assumptions are all I need to derive my results. It is worth commenting,
however, on an implicit assumption that is built into the model. This
assumption is that a sufficiently high level of demand leads firms to hire
even the long-term unemployed. Firms turn to these workers when they
exhaust the pool of short-term unemployed: they would rather pay a small
retraining cost than leave jobs vacant. My story thus differs from hystere-
sis theories in which the long-term unemployed suffer such damage to
their human capital or work ethic that they can never again work. Obvi-
ously, my assumption means that increases in unemployment are more
easily reversible.
50. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
51. This discussion glosses over the question of how higher real-wage demands feed
into inﬂation—how a “wage curve” leads to a Phillips curve. This question arises for tradi-
tional Phillips curves as well as for my model. As discussed by Whelan (1997), one can
answer the question by assuming that workers have backward-looking inﬂation expectations.
52. Blanchard and Diamond (1994).
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Once again, my assumption is motivated by empirical evidence. The
experiences of the success countries show that strong demand does pro-
duce jobs for the long-term unemployed. In the United Kingdom, for
example, as the unemployment rate fell from 11.6 percent in 1985 to
6.9 percent in 1997, the rate of long-term unemployment (spells exceeding
a year) fell from 7.8 percent to 3.8 percent. The fall in long-term un-
employment accounted for 4.0 percentage points of the 4.7-percentage-
point reduction in total unemployment.
Thus in my model the long-term unemployed do not put pressure on
wages (as suggested by the Phillips curve evidence), but they can be
reemployed if demand is sufficiently strong (as suggested by the success
countries). This is possible because of the small cost of hiring the long-
term unemployed. With this cost, ﬁrms prefer the short-term unemployed
to the long-term unemployed, making the latter irrelevant to wage deter-
mination, but they prefer to hire the long-term unemployed rather than hire
nobody.
Inﬂation and Alternative Employment Paths
Here I derive the effects of alternative employment paths on inflation
and compare the results with my empirical ﬁndings.
TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT RECESSIONS. I first compare the
effects of reducing employment temporarily and permanently. I use the
results to interpret my findings about policy responses to recessions. The
case of a permanent decrease in employment captures the experience of
the E4 in the early 1980s, when employment fell and passive policy
allowed it to stay low. The case of a temporary decrease captures the U.S.-
Canada pattern of a fall in employment followed by a policy-induced
recovery. My main theoretical result is that, as in actual experience, there
is little difference in the two scenarios’effects on inﬂation.
Table 8 summarizes the experiment. The table shows alternative paths
of total employment and their implications for short-term unemployment
and inﬂation. I assume the economy is in steady state in period zero, with
E and π at initial levels E0 and π0 and the ratio S/E at b. In period 1,
employment falls to xE0, x < 1. I consider two scenarios for period 2:
employment stays at xE0, and employment returns to E0. In both cases
employment remains constant at its period-2 level after period 2.
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For each employment path, equation (1) determines the path of S; this
path and the Phillips curve determine the path of inﬂation, which I express
in terms of deviations from the initial level π0. As shown in the table, inﬂa-
tion falls by an amount a(1 – x)/x in period 1. If employment stays low in
period 2, inflation stays constant in that period. If employment returns to
E0,i n ﬂation rises to a level that is a(1 – x)(1/x – b) below the initial level.
Thus the model implies that either a temporary or a permanent fall in
employment causes a permanent fall in inﬂation. The inﬂation decrease is
larger if employment falls permanently, but not by much for plausible
parameter values. The ratio of the inflation decrease when E falls
temporarily to when it falls permanently is greater than 1 – b. Recall that
b is the steady-state ratio of short-term unemployment to employment. For
OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s, a typical value of this ratio is
0.05.
53 If b = 0.05, then 95 percent of the inflation reduction from a
permanent employment fall is achieved by a temporary fall. This result is
consistent with my empirical finding that temporary and permanent
employment reductions have similar effects on inﬂation.
My theoretical result can be explained as follows. When a recession
destroys jobs, it initially creates short-term unemployment, which reduces
inflation. If employment stays low, however, the short-term unemployed
turn into long-term unemployed and stop putting pressure on inﬂation. At
this point a demand expansion can bring people back to work without
giving up much inﬂation reduction.
DEMAND EXPANSIONS. The model also implies that a demand expan-
sion raises employment permanently with modest inflationary costs.
Table 9 shows what happens if employment rises from E0 in period zero
Table 8. Effects of Permanent and Temporary Falls in Employment on
Short-Term Unemployment and Inﬂationa
Period E S S/E π – π0
0 E0 bE0 b 0
1 xE0 (1 – x + bx)E0 (1 – x + bx)/x –a(1 – x)/x
2 (permanent fall) xE0 bxE0 b –a(1 – x)/x
2 (temporary fall) E0 bxE0 bx –a(1 – x)(1/x – b)
a. E is employment, S is short-term unemployment, π is inﬂation, b is the breakup rate of existing employer-employee matches,
and x is a constant less than one.
53. Nickell (1997).
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to xE0 in period 1, where here x > 1, and then remains constant. Using
equations (1) and (2), the table shows that inflation rises by ab(x – 1)/x.
This increase is much smaller than the inflation decrease caused by a
fall in employment. Tables 8 and 9 imply that the ratio of the inflation
increase from a permanent rise in E to the reduction from a permanent fall
in E by the same percentage is less than b. Again, a plausible value of
b is 0.05. Thus the model captures the fact that demand expansions raised
inflation in the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, but not
by as much as contractions reduce inflation.
Indeed, the theoretical result is overly strong. In practice, the inflation
effects of employment increases are smaller than those of employment
decreases, but the ratio of these effects is larger than 0.05. The inflation
runups in the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom were not
trivial. In the model, an increase in employment from a demand expan-
sion comes entirely from a decrease in long-term unemployment: when
employment rises, short-term unemployment is a fixed proportion of pre-
vious employment. The ratio S/E falls somewhat, raising inﬂation, but only
because the denominator rises. In reality, an increase in employment is not
accounted for entirely by a decrease in long-term unemployment. A real-
world expansion causes a decrease in the separation rate (which I treat as
ﬁxed) as well as an increase in hiring. Fewer separations mean less short-
term unemployment, and hence a greater rise in inﬂation. Future research
can extend my model to capture these ideas and try to fit the facts more
precisely.
54
Table 9. Effects of a Rise in Employment on Short-Term Unemployment and Inﬂationa
Period E S S/E π – π0
0 E0 bE0 b 0
1 xE0 bE0 b/xa b (x – 1)/x
2  xE0 bxE0 ba b (x – 1)/x
a. E is employment, S is short-term unemployment, π is inﬂation, b is the breakup rate of existing employer-employee matches,
and x is a constant greater than one.
54. If the effect of expansions on separations is strong enough, some of my main results
change; for example, a recession cannot reduce inﬂation permanently unless it raises unem-
ployment permanently. My qualitative results depend on the assumption that changes in
separations play a smaller role in employment increases than in employment decreases.
This assumption is supported by U.S. evidence in Foote and Shin (1999).
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Conclusion
This paper has argued that monetary policy and other determinants of
aggregate demand have long-run effects on unemployment. Throughout
the OECD, the reactions of policy to recessions in the early 1980s helped
determine whether unemployment rose temporarily or permanently. And
since 1985, demand expansions have reduced long-run unemployment in
several countries.
To conclude, I compare my story with those of other authors and then
discuss policy implications.
Comparisons with Recent Literature
Here I discuss several recent papers on unemployment in the OECD
countries.
BALL (1997). The present paper reinforces the message of my previous
paper that aggregate demand has important effects on long-run unem-
ployment. I find here that demand expansions can reduce unemployment
just as contractions can raise it.
The present paper also suggests a new interpretation of one of my ear-
lier results. The 1997 paper found that disinﬂations cause larger increases
in the NAIRU if they last a long time. The data in the present paper show
that countries with long disinflations are those that keep monetary policy
tight despite the onset of recessions. Continuing tight policy means that
inflation falls for longer, although the additional decrease is small. And
continuing tight policy means that the cyclical rise in unemployment
becomes permanent.
BLANCHARD AND WOLFERS (1999). This paper and another by Blan-
chard emphasize that shocks as well as institutions are important for
explaining unemployment.
55 In a broad sense I make a similar point by
arguing that the direct effects of labor market institutions have been
overemphasized. One kind of shock discussed by Blanchard and Wolfers
is shifts in aggregate demand, which they measure by changes in infla-
tion. However, they follow the conventional wisdom in interpreting
demand-driven movements in unemployment as deviations from a long-
run equilibrium. They implicitly deny that demand affects the NAIRU.
55. Blanchard (1999).
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(They do not even cite Blanchard and Summers’ work on hysteresis!)
According to Blanchard and Wolfers, the shocks that shift the NAIRU
are real shocks such as the productivity slowdown.
Another of the Blanchard-Wolfers shocks is the increase in real inter-
est rates in the 1980s. At first glance, blaming unemployment on high
interest rates seems consistent with my story. But following Edmund
Phelps,
56 Blanchard and Wolfers emphasize nontraditional supply-side
channels through which interest rates affect employment. In my story
interest rates affect employment through aggregate demand.
GORDON (1999). From the aftermath of the 1992 breakup of the Euro-
pean Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), Robert Gordon argues that there
is no “macroeconomic free lunch”: expansionary monetary policy cannot
reduce unemployment without raising inflation. Gordon’s view conflicts
with my finding that NAIRU-reducing demand expansions have modest
effects on inflation. (In my story, the lunch is very inexpensive, if not
absolutely free.) In my opinion, Gordon’s analysis is flawed because he
equates a decision to leave the ERM with a generally expansionary mon-
etary policy. In fact, the “leaver” countries include several with tight
policy—notably Finland and Sweden, which replaced exchange rate tar-
gets with inflation targets requiring sharp disinflations. The “stayers,” on
the other hand, include the Netherlands, which, as discussed earlier, was
able to follow a fairly expansionary policy while remaining in the ERM.
Comparing ERM leavers and stayers is not a fair test of the effects of
expansionary policy.
COUNTRY STUDIES. In discussing individual countries, a number of
authors argue that aggregate demand affects long-run movements in unem-
ployment. Discussions that I ﬁnd persuasive include those of Pierre Fortin
and Adam Posen on rising unemployment in Canada and Japan, respec-
tively, and Asbjorn Rodseth on low unemployment in Norway.
57The detail
in these studies complements my argument based on cross-country
evidence.
Policy Implications
In setting policy, central banks should take account of the long-run effects
on unemployment. In particular, my results imply a strong case for com-
56. Phelps (1994).
57. Fortin (1996); Posen (1998); Rodseth (1997).
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bating recessions with expansionary policy. Failing to do so can produce not
only a deeper recession, but also a permanent rise in unemployment.
What should policymakers do if unemployment has settled at a high
level? The experiences of the success countries suggest that some kind of
demand expansion is desirable. The details of the ideal policy are not clear,
however. The expansions in the success countries were largely acci-
dental—they began with shocks to spending that were not caused by pol-
icy. Perhaps an intentional monetary easing could be designed to produce
even better outcomes, such as a fall in unemployment with a smaller runup
in inﬂation. Future research should address this issue.
The results in this paper do not refute the view that major labor market
reforms would reduce unemployment. Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s
have not had large effects, but most of the reforms have been minor. Rad-
ical reforms such as a drastic reduction in UI duration might make a
difference.
Labor market reforms might complement demand expansions. Unem-
ployment is most likely to fall when the unemployed are given incentives
to seek work and a strong economy creates jobs for them to ﬁnd. In addi-
tion, incomes policies might dampen the inflationary effects of demand
expansions, as suggested by Franco Modigliani.
58This may have happened
already in the Netherlands. Labor market and monetary policies could be
complementary at a political level as well. One can imagine a bargain in
which workers accept wage restraint and UI reductions and the central
bank promises a monetary policy that creates jobs.
58. Modigliani (1996).
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Comments and
Discussion
N. Gregory Mankiw: I would like to start my discussion of this paper by
ignoring it for a moment and considering the problem currently (as of early
September 1999) facing Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan. As has been widely noticed, unemployment in the United
States is now far lower than most economists considered possible even a
few years ago. It was not very long ago that estimates of the NAIRU (or, to
use an alternative term, the natural rate of unemployment) for the U.S.
economy ranged from 5.5 percent to over 6 percent. Yet U.S. unemploy-
ment has been below 5 percent for several years, and it is now close to
4 percent. Nonetheless, to the surprise of many of us, inflationary pres-
sure is hard to ﬁnd.
These are, of course, fortunate developments. The problem Greenspan
faces is judging whether they are going to last. Imagine that the Fed staff
produced a report showing convincingly that the NAIRU really was still
5.5 percent and that the low inflation of recent years was attributable to a
series of favorable but temporary supply shocks, such as falling commod-
ity prices due to the Asian slump. Greenspan would probably respond to
this news by raising interest rates, knowing that unless he did, higher inﬂa-
tion was around the corner. On the other hand, imagine that the Fed staff
produced a convincing report concluding that the NAIRU had actually
fallen to 4 percent and would likely keep falling because of, say, the aging
of the population. In this case Greenspan would start worrying less about
inflation and would forgo the increase in interest rates. He might even be
tempted to cut rates a bit.
Nothing in what I have just said is terribly surprising. It is, in fact, the
standard analysis of the current U.S. situation, and I suspect Laurence
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News about the NAIRU influences the monetary policy that the central
bank pursues. When the NAIRU falls, the central bank is given more
room to pursue an expansionary policy of increasing the money supply
and cutting interest rates. Conversely, when the NAIRU rises, the central
bank is more likely to keep monetary policy tight to maintain control over
inflation.
What does all this have to do with this paper? Quite a lot, I think. The
central fact of this paper is that countries that failed to pursue expansion-
ary monetary policy during the recessions of the early 1980s experienced
larger increases in their NAIRUs than did countries that did pursue such a
policy. Ball interprets this fact as a challenge to standard theory, according
to which monetary policy has only short-run effects on unemployment,
and as evidence for long-run effects of aggregate demand. An alternative
interpretation, however, puts causation in the other direction: Countries
that experienced large increases in their NAIRUs were induced to pursue
less expansionary monetary policy. This alternative interpretation of Ball’s
evidence is in line with the description of Greenspan’s current problem
that I started with.
Let me put the same issue in more formal, econometric terms. In his
table 5, Ball presents results from regressing the change in a country’s
NAIRU on a measure of its monetary policy (the change in real interest
rates during a recession) and a measure of its labor market policy (the
duration of unemployment insurance). The significant coefficient on the
monetary policy variable captures the central result of this paper, which
Ball interprets as showing that monetary policy inﬂuences the NAIRU. But
of course this regression is estimated by the ordinary least-squares method,
so it is valid only if the true residual is uncorrelated with the right-hand
side variables. In particular, shocks to the NAIRU have to be unrelated to
monetary policy. That might be true, but it would not be my first guess.
And it certainly is not an identifying assumption that I would feel com-
fortable using to discredit standard theory, as Ball tries to do in this paper. 
I do not mean to imply that my alternative interpretation is right and
Ball’s is wrong. I only mean to suggest that the matter is far from settled.
My alternative interpretation of the evidence is based on exogenous
changes in the NAIRU that monetary policymakers respond to. Ball’s
interpretation is based on exogenous differences in monetary policy that,
for reasons left out of standard theory, influence the economy’s long-run
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razor does point toward my less radical view, for it does not require a
major revision and complication of macroeconomic theory, but in the
absence of any truly exogenous instrument to test the competing theories,
there is no way to be sure.
Ball believes that one can settle the issue by examining the rhetoric
offered by the central banks. He argues that by reading how central
bankers explain their actions, we can judge whether differences in policy
are exogenous random events or endogenous responses to economic devel-
opments. I wish it were so easy. Rhetoric, too, is endogenous. A central
bank facing a recession due to inadequate aggregate demand is likely to
put forward more antirecessionary rhetoric than a central bank facing a
recession due to an increase in the natural rate. When a central bank thinks
it can hit the ball out the park, it steps up to the plate. When it thinks it is
going to strike out, it may not even show up for the game.
So my first reaction to this paper is that I am not convinced by the key
motivating fact. I am, however, intrigued by the model that Ball eventually
builds up to. In particular, the idea that long-term and short-term unem-
ployment might have different roles in the inﬂation process seems plausi-
ble to me. That idea deserves a careful hearing. I say this because
long-term unemployment seems like a different phenomenon than short-
term unemployment. A person who just lost his or her job because of a cor-
porate downsizing, for instance, is probably looking hard for a new one.
A person who has been unemployed for a year or more may have given
up an intensive job search and might more realistically be counted as out
of the labor force. 
Alternatively, perhaps such a person should really be counted as
employed. This possibility was suggested to me by a professor from Ire-
land who visited Harvard last year. The Irish professor, who, like me, had
several small children, told me that one advantage of living in Ireland
was the great supply of child care workers willing to work at low wages.
He explained that large numbers of young Irish women are living on the
dole as long-term unemployed while working full-time as nannies. Obvi-
ously, this employment masquerading as unemployment shows up as a
higher measured NAIRU. Whether it is affected by monetary policy the
professor did not say.
I hope that in future work Ball will develop the implications of his new
Phillips curve model more completely. One possible area to explore
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concerns strategies for reducing inflation. An issue hotly debated in the
late 1970s was whether policymakers facing high inflation should try to
reduce it gradually or eliminate it quickly. Ball’s model seems to argue
for the cold-turkey approach, because trying to reduce inflation gradually
pushes many workers into long-term unemployment, which does little to
reduce inﬂation. This theoretical result is, I should note, consistent with an
empirical finding in one of Ball’s earlier papers that rapid disinflations
are less costly (as measured by standard sacrifice ratio calculations) than
gradual ones.
1
I also wonder what Ball’s model says about optimal macroeconomic
policy. In particular, does this model say that stable employment is the
most desirable path for the economy? Or might some amount of fluctua-
tion be a good thing, for then temporary booms can pull people out of
long-term unemployment? To be more precise, here is a question one
might ask: Which path, one of stable or one of fluctuating employment,
produces the highest average employment (holding constant the terminal
inflation rate)? Given all its nonlinearities, this model does not seem to
exhibit the strongest form of the natural rate hypothesis, according to
which average employment is completely invariant to monetary policy.
But from what the paper says, I am not really sure what an employment-
maximizing monetary policy would look like.
Ball might also think about whether his model generates any new and
interesting testable predictions that we might bring to the data, as opposed
to just explaining the facts that motivate the model. His model suggests
that monetary shocks have different effects depending on the stage of the
business cycle. One can imagine an empirical study that applies time-
series techniques to try to identify these nonlinearities. There has been a
bit of empirical work showing that monetary shocks have asymmetric
effects—that is, positive shocks do not have precisely the opposite effect
of negative shocks.
2 This is not the same nonlinearity that Ball’s model
predicts, but this result does suggest that there is some hope of finding sig-
niﬁcant nonlinearities in the aggregate time series.
The evidence in this paper is valuable for being both straightforward
and thought-provoking. And certainly the issues Ball takes on here are
among the most important in economics. Although I am not ready to
1. Ball (1994).
2. Cover (1992).
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open to the possibility that his view is right—that aggregate demand does
have long-lived effects on employment and production. The evidence pre-
sented here, however, does not convince me to sign on yet.
William D. Nordhaus: Anyone who follows both mainstream macro-
economics and the newspapers knows that the textbook model of the
wage-price-unemployment process is in trouble. By the textbook model,
I mean the standard accelerationist Phillips curve centered on a stable
NAIRU determining wage inﬂation. 
What is the trouble? In the United States, the puzzle is the low infla-
tion that has persisted through the long expansion and low unemploy-
ment of the late 1990s. Economic studies from earlier periods suggested
that wage and price inflation would begin to rise when unemployment
fell below its lowest sustainable rate, generally thought to be somewhere
between 5 and 6 percent of the labor force. Unemployment fell below
5 percent three years ago. Yet inﬂation has actually declined slightly since
then. In Europe, the textbook model is in even deeper water: nothing
resembling plausible or stable NAIRUs can be found for most countries.
When faced with an anomaly, economists can either find special factors
to account for it, or look for another theory. The Brookings Panel often
leans to the special-factors approach. It has been employed through many
vintages by Robert Gordon, most recently in his paper on the Goldilocks
economy.
1 Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger sound a similar theme in their
recent Brookings Paper on labor markets.
2
The orthodox view of the recent U.S. experience runs as follows:
—The 1990s saw an unusually muted response of wages to low unem-
ployment. One reason was that a more experienced work force and a larger
prison population reduced the fraction of the labor force in high-
unemployment groups and thereby lowered the NAIRU. A decline in labor
unions may have lowered wage pressures. Some also believe that the




2. Katz and Krueger (1999).
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through a deep recession. When weak demand abroad was added to an
appreciating dollar, import prices into the United States actually fell. Addi-
tionally, a rebound in labor productivity growth reduced the growth of unit
labor costs and of prices for domestically produced goods and services. 
—One new factor was the growing globalization of production. As the
United States becomes more integrated in world markets, domestic firms
find their ability to raise prices constrained by the low prices of interna-
tional competitors. Even with domestic sales of automobiles booming,
domestic automakers cannot raise their prices or wages by much for fear
of losing market share to Japanese and other foreign producers.
I suppose one could take the same approach to European unemploy-
ment and look for special factors, particularly labor market policies, to res-
cue the basic framework. This seems a fool’s errand, however, and has
seldom been followed.
The usual approach taken to explain European unemployment has been
to posit that the NAIRU is neither constant nor stable but changes
markedly over time in response to macroeconomic structure and policies.
A vast literature works this side of the street—one associates the names
of Olivier Blanchard, Stephen Nickell, and Edmund Phelps with the view
that the NAIRU varies over time with changes in interest rates, labor mar-
ket policies, unionism, and other factors. My reading pretty much con-
forms to that of Laurence Ball in concluding that these studies have
not been terribly successful in explaining changes or differences in
unemployment. 
Ball argues that the textbook model is in trouble, and he clearly takes
the second approach—rejecting the constant NAIRU—to explaining inﬂa-
tion and unemployment behavior. His approach is to build upon what are
called hysteresis models.
I have a few complaints about some of the details of the paper. One
problem involves the somewhat loose discussion of the variables. The
discussion focuses on the impacts of monetary policy, yet the underlying
model is really about changes in aggregate demand or capacity utiliza-
tion. I fail to see the point of the attempt in the early part of the paper to
identify policy changes. I found myself unhappy with the treatment of
monetary policy for countries outside the United States, particularly in
Europe. The role of exchange rate policy is given insufﬁcient attention, yet
the interaction of monetary policy and exchange rate policy would be
242 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
08032—BI/BPEA Ball  12/30/99 9:19 AM  Page 242critical for some countries. Surely, for the case of the Netherlands, with
its hard peg to the German mark, it makes little sense to talk about the
reaction of monetary policy to recessions. The same is true of most other
countries to different degrees in different periods.
It is also worth recalling that estimating NAIRUs is a treacherous busi-
ness and that some of the NAIRU changes that Ball analyzes may simply
be errors in measurement. I have some difficulty accepting a procedure
that yields a NAIRU for Switzerland of percent and a NAIRU for Spain
of 18 percent. I also have difﬁculty swallowing an increase in the German
NAIRU from 1 or 2 percent in the 1960s to 8 percent in the 1990s.
There is some fuzziness in the discussion of the NAIRUs. Are these
wage NAIRUs or price NAIRUs? Surely we should be analyzing wage
NAIRUs. Similarly, I would prefer to examine wage inflation rather than
price inflation, because many changes in price inflation involve many
non–labor market inﬂuences, and that point gets overlooked.
Turning to the core of the paper, I do think that Ball is onto something
important and interesting in pointing to the role of the duration of un-
employment in understanding wage-unemployment dynamics. To understand
what Ball is proposing, remember that the standard Phillips curve model
uses the conventional unemployment rate to measure the pressure of
demand in labor markets. In effect, this assumes that every unemployed
worker puts the same downward pressure on wage increases, whether that
worker is a high-wage computer scientist, a unionized steelworker, or a
teenager loosely attached to the labor force. The model assumes, more-
over, that anyone who is out of the labor force puts no pressure on wages.
I doubt that anyone really believes such an oversimplified model. There
is a long tradition, going back to George Perry’s studies of wage behav-
ior, that develops alternative measures of unemployment. But as long as
the structure of unemployment is stable, putting different weights on dif-
ferent people would make little difference.
Ball’s suggestion is to redeﬁne the unemployment rate when we are try-
ing to understand wage dynamics. He would put only the short-term un-
employment rate in the Phillips curve. His defense of this is somewhat
cursory, but we might well take this approach if we believe that workers
become discouraged and loosely attached to the labor force as their un-
employment duration lengthens. In effect, Ball draws the line between active
and inactive participants in the labor market differently from that used in
standard deﬁnitions. 
Laurence Ball 243
08032—BI/BPEA Ball  12/30/99 9:19 AM  Page 243I do not think Ball’s model does justice to the complicated dynamics
of unemployment, nor does his analysis of the impact of changes in
demand seem quite right to me. The model has only two periods and there-
fore does not really capture the impact of changes in labor market poli-
cies or changes in demand on the duration of unemployment. 
The most interesting and complex issue involves the relationship
between employment dynamics and wage behavior. We are not allowed
to use differential equations in Brookings Papers comments, so I will have
to put this in English. Ball assumes the polar case of “LIFO” reemploy-
ment—the last ﬁred are the ﬁrst rehired. This means that the unemployed
are vintaged, with recent separations always going to, and employers
always hiring from, the top of the barrel. 
We can think of the wage dynamics as operating in two regimes. In nor-
mal times, employers are simply hiring the short-term unemployed, and
wage inflation is symmetrical in expansions and contractions. I am not
sure Ball’s discussion of short-run changes is consistent with this more
complex model.
The interesting new regime operates either in long expansions or in long
contractions. In long expansions, employers dip deeper and deeper into the
unemployment barrel, and the number of long-term unemployed
decreases. In long contractions, the number of long-term unemployed at
the bottom of the barrel increases. These increases or decreases do not
affect wages, however, so the contraction is for anti-inflationary naught,
and policy has found the holy grail of an inﬂation-free expansion.
Ball argues that his approach turns into a hysteresis model once we
recognize the complicated dynamics of long-term and short-term un-
employment. It is not clear to me that his is genuinely a hysteresis model.
Rather, it seems that, because the conventional Phillips curve model has
the wrong independent variable, it requires a complicated inversion of the
lag structure to uncover the unemployment-inﬂation relationship. 
Put differently, if there is a stable set of flow relationships connecting
short-term and long-term unemployment, then the long-run inflation-
unemployment tradeoff is independent of history, and the long-run NAIRU
is unaffected by demand. It would be the case, however, that the short-run
NAIRU depends upon the history of employment and unemployment.
What does all this imply for policy? The main implication of Ball’s
approach is that anti-inflation policy should focus on maximizing short-
term unemployment, given that increases in long-term unemployment
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implications for the conduct of stabilization policy. Although Ball does not
work out the optimal anti-inflation policy, I would label his approach the
Powell-Ball doctrine for economic stabilization:
Use massive and overwhelming recessionary force to overwhelm the inflation-
ary enemy. Conduct a short and vicious war. Take many prisoners, but let them
go after a few months. Stun workers but do not maim them. They should return
to the negotiating table bloodied by the recent memory of unemployment. Above
all, avoid a European-style war of attrition in which you keep long-term
unemployment high for extended periods.
All this is fascinating. But it remains more suggestive than convincing,
because the evidence in the paper is thin and the modeling primitive. We
need much more evidence to show that short-term unemployment will
improve upon the conventional measure everywhere and always, or even
anywhere and sometime. Sifting through the evidence will be a long and
tedious process. But as someone once said, that’s why God made gradu-
ate students.
General discussion: William Dickens discussed how a model of nominal
wage rigidity with a sufficiently large variance of desired wage changes
would fit the stylized facts that the paper attempted to explain. In such a
model, low inﬂation may be associated with high unemployment, and a pos-
itive aggregate demand shock may raise inﬂation and lower unemployment
as in a standard Phillips curve. But a positive productivity shock will permit
faster nominal wage growth and lower unemployment without price inﬂation.
Dickens reported that estimates of such a model for several OECD countries
were more stable and required fewer special dummies than standard
Phillips curve estimates.
Edmund Phelps observed that most researchers who had studied
Europe’s economies remained skeptical about the importance of hysteresis
effects for unemployment. Along with statistical reasons for rejecting it,
there is the fact that the standard adverse effects are offset by a large favorable
one: with poor job prospects, people continue their education for longer
than they otherwise would, effectively taking themselves out of the
unemployment pool. Phelps also questioned the paper’s ﬁnding on monetary
policy because it ignored the large literature that uses variables such as
the world real interest rate, real exchange rates, wealth, the relative price of
energy, and tax rates in explaining unemployment. He also found plausible
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useful in the United States because the natural rate kept falling, whereas in
Europe there were no such favorable changes in the natural rate to exploit. 
Alan Blinder said he found hysteresis models useful in explaining the
1970s and 1980s, when tight stabilization policies were followed by
chronic increases in unemployment in many European countries. However,
he stressed that most European economists did not share this view and
would agree with the reverse causation argument articulated by Mankiw.
He suggested two case studies that might shed light on this disagreement.
One is the dramatically different experiences of Britain and France after
1992, when Britain left the ERM while France stayed in it. Although
Britain’s decision to quit was not an exogenous event, it may have had
more to do with politics than economics. The other case is that of the U.S.
economy since 1996, a period in which it has widely outperformed
predictions from NAIRU models. Blinder characterized this period as an
unexpected boom rather than one in which the Federal Reserve perceived
that the natural rate was dropping and eased accordingly. William Brainard
agreed, noting that the Fed kept making wrong forecasts, was then surprised
by how well the economy did, and decided to hold off any tightening, in
effect showing disbelief in the NAIRU. However, Mankiw argued that, if
inflation had worsened, the Fed would have tightened, revealing the kind
of endogenous response that creates a problem for the estimates in the
paper, whose validity depends on policy being exogenous.
While accepting the potential for long-run effects of monetary policy,
Lawrence Katz found the evidence in the paper inconclusive. He agreed
that simple correlations with institutional differences could not explain
much. In the 1950s and 1960s, many countries with relatively rigid labor
market institutions had low unemployment rates. In the 1990s, countries
with relatively ﬂexible labor markets, like the United States, had the lowest
unemployment rates. However, he also noted that the correlation between
rigid institutions and the tendency of negative shocks to persist over time,
which Ball regarded as spurious, might instead reﬂect interactions between
negative shocks and institutional rigidities. Shocks could plausibly produce
worse outcomes in systems where insiders have more power and outsiders
are disenfranchised by restrictive hiring and ﬁring practices, and in systems
with generous long-term unemployment benefits. Furthermore, he
reasoned that technology growth, globalization, and the improved ability
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institutions and shocks. 
Christopher Carroll was skeptical of relying on aggregate demand
explanations for long-term labor market outcomes. Like Katz, he sug-
gested that the interaction of institutional factors with real shocks might
account for the unemployment disparities of recent years. Specifically,
the European labor market rigidities that were not a problem in the first
postwar decades of high productivity growth may have become a source of
chronic unemployment when productivity growth slowed. Carroll added
that the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry model could explain how a productivity
slowdown interacts with labor market institutions to increase unemploy-
ment. Austan Goolsbee argued that the paper was unfair to structural
explanations of labor market developments across countries. He noted that
very low effective tax rates, given generous tax exemptions for foreign
companies, have been a large factor in the recent surge in foreign direct
investment and productivity growth in Ireland. 
David Laibson focused on the assumption in the paper’s model that
ﬁrms prefer to hire short-term rather than long-term unemployed. He noted
that, besides the depreciation of human capital that comes with long-term
unemployment, which is the effect the paper focuses on, there are important
income effects that make unemployed workers more eager to take jobs.
Subsidies from the state, unemployment insurance, and private savings
all decrease over the duration of unemployment. Thus he suggested that a
test of Ball’s model would be to see whether Phillips curve effects from the
long-term unemployed were weaker in countries with strong social safety
nets than in countries with weak ones. James Duesenberry noted that it
was a mistake to sort the unemployed by duration without recognizing
other important differences between the short-term and the long-term
unemployed. Long-term unemployment is concentrated in depressed
regions or declining industries, so that the affected workers cannot be
modeled as though they were in similar circumstances to other workers
except for the duration of their unemployment spells.
Robert Hall saw the paper, along with the early work of Blanchard and
Summers on hysteresis, as reinforcing the view that the NAIRU, and the
natural rate of unemployment itself, are not useful ideas. The NAIRU is
supposed to be invariant to monetary policy. Policy affects demand and
moves the economy along the Phillips curve, and the NAIRU is the location
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which monetary policy affects the NAIRU, cannot be reconciled with that
concept of NAIRU or with a stable natural rate. Hall went on to argue for
more broad-minded research, noting that unemployment shows no
tendency to return to a natural rate in any country except the United States
and that wage pressures bear no relation to unemployment rates across
different labor markets in the United States. Whether monetary policy may
be a cause of shifts in the equilibrium unemployment rate, as argued in
the paper, remained an open question.
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